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Abstract 
Widespread bank losses during the financial crisis have raised concerns that equity-based 
compensation for bank CEOs causes excessive risk-taking. Debt-based compensation, so-called 
inside debt, aligns the interests of CEOs with those of external creditors. We examine whether 
inside debt induces CEOs to pursue less risky acquisitions. Consistent with this, we show that 
acquisitions announced by CEOs with high inside debt incentives are associated with a wealth 
transfer from equity to debt holders. After the completion of a deal, banks where acquiring CEOs 
have high inside debt incentives display lower market measures of risk and lower loss exposures 
for taxpayers. 
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1. Introduction 
The risk-taking behavior of senior executives in the banking industry has become a concern 
for the public and for policymakers. Undue risk-taking jeopardizes the safety and soundness of 
individual institutions as well as the stability of the entire financial sector. Undue risk-taking also 
leaves the taxpayer on the hook for the potentially large losses incurred to support a fragile banking 
sector. One of the lessons drawn from the 2007-09 financial crisis therefore is the need to 
understand better how to design appropriate risk-taking incentives for bank executives (Bebchuk 
and Spamann, 2010; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 
2011). 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether executive compensation components that offer 
debt-like payoffs to CEOs align the interests of CEOs with bank debtholders. Debt-like pay is 
commonly referred to as ‘inside debt’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and is made up of deferred 
compensation and pension plans. Inside debt is a substantial component of CEO pay whose value 
can outrank the value of any other type of compensation. Since inside debt is an unsecured and 
unfunded form of firm debt which is serviced out of future cash flows, inside debt should align the 
risk preferences of CEOs with those of outside creditors. Consequently, higher CEO inside debt 
should be associated with creditor-friendly policies, that is, policies that increase the value of debt 
by reducing bank risk. 
At the heart of our paper lies the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors over 
firm risk. Since shareholders hold convex claims over firm assets, the expected payoffs linked to 
equity rise exponentially with risk. Shareholders therefore prefer companies to take more risk than 
do other stakeholders. Shareholders can distort CEO incentives in their favor by structuring CEO 
pay such that it rewards CEOs for greater risk-taking (Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; Freixas 
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and Rochet, 2013; Bolton et al., 2015), for instance by granting CEOs higher equity-based 
compensation, in the form of stock grants and stock options (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is less 
well known that CEO pay can also be aligned with the interests of debt holders. A growing 
literature has shown that compensating CEOs with inside debt can lower the risk-taking 
preferences of CEOs (Edmans and Liu, 2011; Phan, 2014; Bennett et al., 2015; van Bekkum, 
2016). Because inside debt is an unsecured and unfunded form of firm debt, it effectively turns 
CEOs into creditors of their firm. CEOs with holdings of inside debt are exposed to firm default 
risk, as their wealth is closely linked to that of external creditors of the firm.  
Conflicts of interest between shareholders and lenders are more pronounced in the case of 
banks than of other companies. First, banks are highly leveraged institutions, and since the benefit 
to shareholders from increasing risk is positively related to leverage (Parrino and Weisbach, 1999; 
John et al., 2000), bank shareholders have an unusually strong incentive to shift risk to creditors. 
Second, a special feature of banks is the presence of a taxpayer-funded financial safety net in the 
form of deposit insurance and other implicit guarantees. If a bank increases its riskiness, it 
increases the value of the taxpayer-funded safety net to the benefit of shareholders (Merton, 1977; 
Ronn and Verma, 1986; Hovakimian and Kane, 2000). The financial safety net feature is an 
additional reason why shareholders of banks stand to benefit from risk-seeking policies potentially 
at the expense of taxpayers (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Benston et al., 1995).  
In this paper, we study the value and risk implication of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) for 
shareholders, debtholders and the taxpayer. Bank M&A are a major corporate investment decision 
with potentially important implications for different bank stakeholder groups. For instance, bank 
acquisitions may be motivated by shareholder incentives to increase bank risk to extract benefit 
from the government and taxpayer funded financial safety net, with creditors and taxpayers 
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potentially bearing the costs from any increase in post-acquisition bank risk (Carbo-Valverede et 
al., 2008; 2012; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; Molyneux et al., 2014). However, whilst M&A 
may be considered fundamentally risky decisions in isolation (Furfine and Rosen, 2011), they may 
also be associated with reductions in bank risk. For instance, high inside debt may motivate CEOs 
to engage in diversifying and risk-reducing acquisitions. 
We build on existing work on M&A and risk by studying if the relative inside debt ratio1 of 
CEOs has implications for bank acquisitions, and if inside debt helps mitigate conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and debtholders (and taxpayers, by extension). Srivastav et al. (2014) 
examine why certain banks paid or maintained dividends over the recent crisis period. They show 
that CEOs with lower inside debt pay out a greater proportion of excess cash in dividends and 
repurchases. Two further papers also seek to examine how CEO inside debt affects bank risk. 
Bennett et al. (2015) show that larger CEO inside debt holdings before the crisis are associated 
with lower bank default risk during the crisis, whilst van Bekkum (2016) reports a negative relation 
between CEO and CFO inside debt in 2006 and measures of subsequent market volatility and tail 
risk during 2007-09.  
Outside the banking industry, Sundaram and Yermack (2007) identify a positive relationship 
between inside debt and distance to default, Cassell et al. (2012) find that CEO inside debt is 
associated with more conservative firm policies, and Phan (2014) shows that CEO inside debt 
lowers equity volatility post acquisition.  
Our sample consists of acquisitions announced by listed U.S. banks between 2007 and 2012. 
Our sample starts in 2007 so that we can take advantage of the enhanced data disclosure 
requirements for inside debt mandated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from 
                                                             
1 CEO inside debt ratio scaled by the debt ratio of the bank (see Section 2.3 for a discussion). 
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2006. We begin by studying the relationship between inside debt and investor reactions to 
acquisition announcements.  
Our primary event study results indicate that inside debt has a negative impact on abnormal 
stock returns but a positive impact on debtholder wealth on the announcement of acquisitions. This 
result is consistent with our expectation that both groups of investors expect that large inside debt 
holdings incentivize CEOs to engage in acquisitions that result in reducing bank risk. The results 
are economically significant. A one-standard-deviation increase in our measure of inside debt 
(CEO relative inside debt ratio) implies an increase in debt value of 270 basis points and a 
reduction in equity value of 91 basis points2. Interestingly, CEO inside debt has no effect on total 
bank value.  
The paper proceeds by assessing the impact of pre-merger inside debt ratios on realized 
changes in various bank risk measures following the completion of M&A3: a market-based 
distance-to-default measure, stock volatility, and debt volatility. The results show that bank risk is 
negatively related to a CEO’s relative inside debt ratio. A one-standard-deviation increase in inside 
debt implies an increase in a bank’s distance-to-default (i.e. a reduction in risk) of 22.9% compared 
with the pre-acquisition risk value. Moreover, we investigate two key channels through which an 
acquisition could affect a bank’s risk, namely changes in leverage and in asset risk. We find that 
                                                             
2 We note that the results in Table 3 imply that inside debt is not associated with a net value increase in firm value for 
acquiring banks and that the gain to debtholders induced by CEO inside debt arises from a value transfer from equity 
holders. However, the magnitude of gains to debtholders exceeds the magnitude of losses to shareholders for an 
average bank. This can be partially explained by the fact that debt makes up more than 90% of bank assets due to 
which the dollar gains (losses) for debtholders (equityholders) will not be of equal magnitude. We thank one of our 
anonymous reviewers for highlighting this point. 
3 We adjust our risk measures by industry trends in risk. We do so by subtracting changes in the value-weighted risk 
measures of a portfolio of all publicly listed banks (on CRSP) which are not involved in M&A during our examination 
window.  
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the link between CEO inside debt and the change in risk after an acquisition arises because of 
changes in both leverage and asset risk. 
To further corroborate that CEO inside debt implies greater CEO conservativism, we show that 
banks with larger CEO inside debt give rise to lower exposure to loss for taxpayers (who 
underwrite the financial safety net). Our measure for potential taxpayer losses is based on a 
methodology used by Merton (1977), Ronn and Verma (1986), and Duan et al. (1992), which 
models the value of the government’s financial safety net to shareholders as the value of a put 
option underwritten by taxpayers. The value of the put, and the expected value of losses to 
taxpayers, increases with bank risk. We find that there is a negative relation between CEO inside 
debt and the change in the estimated value of the safety net to bank shareholders. This suggests 
that CEO inside debt reduces the propensity of bank CEOs to engage in shifting risk to the safety 
net. 
The paper includes a battery of robustness tests. In particular, our results are robust to 
controlling for possible selection bias, and to an instrumental-variable estimation that controls for 
the possible endogeneity of CEO pay with respect to acquisition-related risk. We acknowledge, 
though, that the terms of the CEO’s pay, and the bank’s policy towards risk, could both be affected 
by the culture of the board, or that high inside debt and low risk-taking could both be due to the 
CEO’s aversion to risk (noted by Bennett et al., 2015). However, at the very least, our results 
document a strong relation between debt-based CEO compensation and various indicators of lower 
bank risk-taking when banks engage in acquisitions. 
The paper makes two primary contributions. First, we extend research investigating the impact 
of CEO pay on bank risk-taking (Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; 
DeYoung et al., 2013; Bennett et al., 2015; van Bekkum, 2016). While we are not the first to 
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examine the effects of inside debt on bank risk (among others, Bennett et al., 2015, and van 
Bekkum, 2016, report a negative relationship between inside debt and bank risk), we add to 
existing evidence in two aspects:  
First, we focus on a specific policy in the form of acquisitions, in which the CEO can safely 
be assumed to have a direct, leading role.4 Our focus on corporate acquisitions therefore aids a 
causal interpretation of the effects of inside debt, because acquisitions provide a relatively clear-
cut means of testing for the relationship between inside debt and decisions through which a CEO 
affects bank risk.  
Perhaps the closest paper in spirit to ours is Phan (2014), who considers whether acquisitions 
involving CEOs with higher inside debt lead to change in the risk of non-financial firms. Like 
Phan (2014), our paper focuses on relationships between CEO inside debt and firm acquisitions. 
However, our paper contributes novel evidence specific to the banking sector. For instance, we 
identify changes in both leverage and asset risk linked to inside debt, and we identify specific deal 
characteristics through which high-inside-debt CEOs influence their bank’s risk. Given the 
presence of safety-net guarantees that is unique to banking, and given that acquisitions can be used 
to increase a bank’s risk, the impact of CEO remuneration on the risk of banks is especially 
pertinent. 
                                                             
4 Our paper departs from recent studies examining the relevance of inside debt for various firm polices. For example, 
Srivastav et al. (2014) focus on bank payout policies. While their work is informative about how inside debt may 
influence one important type of corporate decision, it relates more to a recent literature seeking to explain banks’ 
dividend choices around the recent financial crisis (e.g., Acharya et al., 2017). In contrast to Srivastav et al. (2014), 
we argue that bank acquisitions are more directly revealing of CEO preferences, representing a specific strategic 
corporate policy in which the CEO has a key role and offering a unique perspective into CEO decision making 
(Graham, et al., 2015; Cain and McKeon, 2016). Cain and McKeon (2016) note that “if managerial risk aversion 
imposes agency costs through suboptimal project selection ... then acquisition activity is a plausible channel in which 
we could find systematic differences” (p.141).  
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Second, we contribute to the literature on bank risk and its implications for taxpayers (e.g. 
Benston et al., 1995; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2012; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Hovakimian et al., 
2012). Our paper is the first to link inside debt and other forms of executive compensation to the 
exposure to loss of taxpayers caused by deposit insurance guarantees. In effect, we are able to 
estimate how CEO inside debt and other pay components affect the subsidy which shareholders 
extract from the financial safety net. This is an important question to address, given concerns 
regarding excessive bank risk-taking and failures with implications for macro-economic and 
financial market stability (DeYoung et al., 2009), and given the cost borne by taxpayers in rescuing 
distressed financial institutions. Specifically, we offer important first evidence that inside debt 
affects the industry-adjusted insurance price premium (IPP), a measure of the extent to which 
banks exploit safety-net subsidies and potentially expropriate value from government and 
taxpayers (Ronn and Verma, 1986).   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the research design and 
sample. Section 3 presents the main results, Section 4 discusses the results for the value of the 
safety net, and Section 5 shows the robustness of our tests to various checks. Finally, Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Research design 
2.1 Data 
We begin by sourcing all acquisitions announced by publicly listed US banks between 2007 
and 2012 from the Thomson Financial Mergers and Acquisitions (SDC Platinum) database. 
Consistent with prior literature, we exclude self-tenders, leveraged buyouts, and recapitalizations. 
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As we are interested in examining acquisitions that can potentially affect the risk of the acquirer, 
we require deal values to be at least $10 million. All deals involve U.S. targets.  
This gives us an initial sample of 168 deals. Some banks make multiple acquisitions within the 
same year, and we consolidate such deals into a single deal, following Furfine and Rosen (2011). 
In these cases, deal characteristics are weighted by the value of each transaction, the announcement 
date is the date when the first acquisition was announced, and the completion date is the date when 
the last acquisition was completed. This reduces the sample by 15 deals. 
We further require financial information for the acquiring bank to be available from the 
quarterly FR Y9-C reports, and market data from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP). We eliminate deals where data are not available, and this reduces the sample by a further 
53 deals. Our final sample consists of 101 acquisitions by 62 banks over the period 2007-2012. 
We extract CEO compensation data from Compustat’s Execucomp database for 66 bank-year 
observations and, where missing, supplement Execucomp data with hand-collected data (35 bank-
year observations) from proxy statements (DEF 14A) filed with the SEC. Corporate governance 
data are from the Riskmetrics database, also supplemented with data from DEF 14A filings where 
data items are missing.  
 
2.2 Dependent variables 
2.2.1 Acquisition-related change in bank value 
We compute abnormal returns on bank equity and debt using the market model as follows:     
Rit = ai + bi Rmt + eit                          (1) 
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where  Rit is the return of security i on day t and Rmt is the return on a bank market index. The bank 
market index is constructed using value-weighted daily returns data for all public banks. We 
compute Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) over a [-2, +2] day interval surrounding the deal 
announcement.   
The daily returns on a bank’s debt in equation (1) are calculated using the estimated market 
values of debt. We follow Eisdorfer et al. (2013) to estimate the market value of debt via a two-
equation contingent claims model (as originally proposed by Ronn and Verma (1986), see 
Appendix C).5 The reason we select this approach over computing CARs on bonds that trade in 
the secondary market is to preserve a meaningful sample size. Additionally, bonds only make up 
a small fraction of bank liabilities. Most bank liabilities are in the form of deposits and other non-
tradable securities which are not accounted for in an event study on bond prices.  
 
2.2.2 Acquisition-related change in bank risk 
 Default risk. Our main measure of risk is the Merton distance-to-default (DD) measure, where 
default is viewed as occurring when the market value of a firm’s assets falls short of the face value 
of its liabilities. Gropp et al. (2006) demonstrate that DD can be applied to banking firms and that 
DD scores outperform other measures of risk in terms of predicting bank default over most 
examination periods. Under the DD model, the default risk of a firm is calculated as the number 
of standard deviations by which the market value of its assets needs to fall to reach the default 
point. Therefore, higher DD means a safer bank. Following Gropp et al. (2006), we express DD 
as:  
                                                             
5 As a robustness test, we repeat our main analysis using bond data for 31 observations following Bessembinder et al. 
(2009) and May (2010) and CDS data for 24 observations following Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) and Wei 
and Yermack (2011). We confirm that our main results remain qualitatively similar over this smaller sub-sample.  
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DDt = (ln(VA,t/Lt ) + (r - 0.5 σA,t)2T) ⁄ (σA,t T)                                                      (3) 
where VA,t is the market value of assets at date t, Lt is the book value of the bank’s liabilities, σA,t is 
a measure of asset volatility calculated using the standard deviation of asset values, and T is set 
equal to 1 to determine the acquirer’s default risk in the next year. The calculation of VA,t and σA,t 
is explained in Appendix C.  
To measure the change in risk due to an acquisition, we calculate the average daily DD value 
of each acquirer over the period of 180 to 11 trading days before the deal is first announced, and 
11 to 180 days after a deal has been completed, adjusted for industry trends. A change in industry-
adjusted distance-to-default (∆Distance-to-Default) between announcement and completion of the 
acquisition can then be calculated: 
 
  ∆Distance-to-Defaulti  =  ∆DDi – Average ∆DD of non-acquiring banks      (4) 
 
where a positive value of ∆DD implies a reduction in default risk. 
Equity and debt risk. To measure the change in risk due to an acquisition, we calculate the 
equity (debt) volatility as the standard deviation of abnormal equity (debt) returns that are used to 
compute CARs in Section 2.2.1 above. Volatility measures are computed for each acquirer over 
180 to 11 trading days before the deal is announced and 11 to 180 days after a deal has been 
completed.  
Our risk measures also consider general industry trends in risk. For instance, if many 
acquisitions occur towards the end of distressed periods for the banking industry, we may wrongly 
attribute a reduction in bank risk in the post-acquisition period to the acquisition rather than to the 
return of market conditions back to normal levels. General industry trends are calculated by means 
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of a value-weighted average volatility score, over the same pre- and post-acquisition windows for 
each deal, across all banks on CRSP which did not engage in an acquisition. The change in the 
industry-adjusted equity or debt volatility between announcement and completion of an acquisition 
can then be calculated as follows: 
 
∆Equity risk (∆Debt risk)i  =  DEquity volatility (DDebt volatility)i  – DAverage equity volatility 
(DAverage debt volatility) of non-acquiring banks   (5)               
 
where a negative value of ∆Equity risk (∆Debt risk) implies a reduction in bank risk. 
  
2.3 CEO inside debt 
The argument that inside debt affects the CEO’s incentive to take risk is simply that, other 
things being equal, the value of the bank’s debt, including inside debt, is maximised by taking less 
risk than the risk required to maximise the value of its equity. This is because some high-risk 
projects create more value per dollar of equity than per dollar of debt and vice versa for some low-
risk projects. To measure the incentive effect of CEO inside debt on firm risk, we follow several 
recent papers in computing CEO inside debt as the CEO inside debt ratio scaled by the debt ratio 
of the bank (e.g., Cassell et al., 2012):  
  
CEO relative inside debt ratio =  CEO inside debt/CEO equity                         (6) 
 Bank debt/Bank equity 
 
where CEO inside debt is the sum of the present value of accumulated pension benefits and 
deferred compensation, as estimated by the bank and shown in its proxy statement; CEO equity is 
12 
the value of the CEO’s holdings of equity and stock, as at the financial year-end of the bank; Bank 
debt is the total of the bank’s deposits and debt outstanding; and Bank equity is the market value 
of the bank’s equity, adjusted for the value of the stock options, estimated from the Black-Scholes 
formula using data as at the financial year-end. Data on the stock options outstanding is from the 
annual 10-K report filings with the SEC. The scaling in (6) means that, if CEO relative inside debt 
ratio is equal to one, the CEO owns the same proportion of the bank’s debt as of its equity. In this 
case, the CEO has no personal incentive to select either high-risk projects that favour equity, or 
low-risk projects that favour debt.  
 
2.4 Control variables 
 CEO option-based incentives. Our purpose is to examine the relationship between CEO 
behavior and the incentive to take risk that arises from the mix of inside equity and debt in CEO 
wealth. A separate incentive to take risk, one that is not measured by an inside debt ratio, arises as 
a consequence of the CEO’s holding of stock options. We calculate CEO vega and CEO delta for 
the CEO’s portfolio of inside equity and options, following a standard methodology as set out in 
Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002). Vega is the rate of change of the value of the portfolio of 
inside equity and options with respect to the volatility of the shares. If there are no options, vega 
is zero. Delta is the rate of change of the value of the portfolio with respect to the price of the 
shares. Delta is equal to one for the equity component, and it is a number between 0 and 1 for the 
stock options. Since vega and delta incentives are highly correlated with bank size, we scale them 
by total cash compensation following Hangedorff and Vallascas (2011).  
Firm-specific variables. We control for bank-specific attributes by including measures of bank 
size, ln(Assets), and profitability, Net income/Assets, where assets are measured at book value. We 
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also include the bank’s Charter value, defined as the market value of assets divided by the book 
value as at the financial year-end. This is a measure of the present value of growth opportunities 
for the bank (Keeley, 1990; Demsetz et al, 1996; Goyal 2005). Because charter value captures the 
present value of future profits that a bank is expected to earn as a going concern, it is an important 
factor in explaining a bank’s willingness to assume risks (Demsetz et al, 1996).  
We also include a measure of leverage, Equity/Assets, since the benefits to shareholders from 
risk-taking are increasing in bank leverage (John and John, 1993). Our measure of leverage is Tier-
1 equity divided by the book value of assets6. Finally, we include dummy variable High return ( 
High risk) which is one if a bank is in the top (bottom) quartile of return (risk), and zero otherwise. 
The high risk dummy captures incentives of high risk banks to pursue acquisitions that reduce their 
risk (Furfine and Rosen, 2011; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011). For instance, Furfine and Rosen 
(2011) show that the pre-merger default risk of firms affects their merger-related changes in risk. 
Corporate governance. Prior research has shown that banks with stronger boards, characterised 
by the quality of board monitoring and advising, make decisions more consistent with shareholder 
incentives to encourage risk-taking (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; John et al., 2008; Pathan, 2009). 
We control for the strength of the board by means of a dummy variable which equals one if the 
CEO also serves as the chairman (CEO is chair), and by including the percentage of independent 
directors (%boardindep), and the number of directors on the board (Board size). We also include 
the age of the CEO (Ln(CEO age)) since it is possible that older CEOs are more likely to be 
conservative with respect to risk. 
                                                             
6 This regulatory leverage ratio has been employed, amongst others, by Abreu and Gulamhussen (2013) and Rampini 
et al. (2017). One of the salient features of this leverage measure is that it is of specific significance from a bank 
regulatory perspective. Large U.S. banks are required to operate with Tier 1 capital of at least 4% relative to 
unweighted total assets. Focusing on this leverage measure allows us to control for the ‘quality’ and extent of bank 
capital, factors which may influence strategic bank decisions, including corporate acquisitions.  
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Deal characteristics. Deal size and risk could be positively related, due to increased 
complexity when integrating the target bank into the operations of the acquirer. We control for the 
relative size of acquisitions (Relative Size), defined as the amount paid for the target bank divided 
by the acquirer’s market capitalization at the time of the announcement. Larger deals may lead to 
more diversification gains that may reduce the risk of firm debt through reductions in default risk 
(Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011). In addition, the method of financing a deal can also affect the 
acquirer’s default risk, e.g. a cash-financed deal could increase default risk by depleting the bank’s 
most liquid assets (Choi et al., 2010). To control for this, we include Method of Financing, which 
measures the percentage of the acquisition financed by stock. We also control for diversification, 
since this should be negatively related to risk. The dummy variable Diversifying takeover is equal 
to one if the target and acquirer have different SIC sub-industry classifications. A private (unlisted) 
target bank is likely to have a higher degree of opacity (Officer et al., 2009), which could be 
positively related to post-takeover risk. Thus, we control for whether the deal involved a Private 
target.  
Macroeconomic conditions. Since CEOs face fewer restrictions on their choice of bank policies 
during periods of economic growth, they may be more likely to pursue risky policies during periods 
of economic growth (DeYoung et al., 2013). Accordingly, we control for macroeconomic 
conditions. Our measure, Macro conditions, is the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s state-
coincident index which summarizes the macroeconomic conditions in the state where the acquirer 
has its headquarters.  
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2.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 Panel A reports the annual distribution of M&A deals. Nearly 40% of deals were 
announced in 2007, whilst Table 1 Panel B provides correlations between our dependent variables 
and key controls (bank CEO pay incentives and financials). Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. 
The mean (median) announcement CAR is -0.011 (-0.018) for equity, -0.053 (-0.005) for debt, and 
-0.096 (-0.008) for the value-weighted average of equity and debt combined. The negative market 
reaction is consistent with extant bank M&A evidence (see DeYoung et al., 2009 for a review of 
the post-2000 literature).  
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
The mean (median) CEO relative inside debt ratio is 0.070 (0.045) which is comparable to 
those reported in other studies on banks ((see Bennett et al. (2015) and van Bekkum (2016)). The 
relative figure indicates clearly that the personal incentives of bank CEOs are aligned more towards 
shareholders than towards creditors. In addition, mean CEO vega is 0.135 (0.035), and mean CEO 
delta 0.514 (0.158), indicating that the risk-increasing incentive arising from stock options is quite 
substantial in relation to the incentive to increase shareholder value arising from the CEO’s 
holdings of equity and options. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 provides a first indication as to whether inside debt affects ∆Distance-to-Default 
(∆DD). The figure shows the average DD for each day in the 180-day event windows before 
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acquisition announcement and after completion, for the top and bottom quartile of banks by CEO 
inside debt ratio. An upward shift indicates an increase in the average distance-to-default (i.e. a 
reduction in default risk). There is a substantial difference across the two samples with respect to 
the impact of the acquisition on bank risk. Average DD for the low-inside-debt sample of acquirers 
shows no obvious change after the acquisition, whereas average DD increases (risk declines) 
noticeably for the high-inside-debt sample7. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Inside debt and changes in bank value: market expectations of risk-taking 
In this section, we start by exploring the relationship between CEO inside debt holdings and 
changes in bank equity, bank debt, and total bank value. In each case, our relevant dependent 
variable is the estimated CAR from an event study computed using daily returns, as previously 
explained in Section 2.2.1.  
We use the estimated equity (debt) CAR in the following regression model: 
 
CARi,t  = β0 + β1(CEO relative inside debt ratioi,t–1) + β2(Control variablesi,t–1) + β4(Ft) +  εi,t  (7)  
 
where CARi,t is the cumulative abnormal equity (debt) return estimated from equation 1, and Ft is 
a dummy variable equal to one each fiscal year t. A positive CAR value implies a positive abnormal 
merger return to equity (debt) holders from a bank acquisition. 
 
                                                             
7 We also conduct univariate tests to confirm the intuition behind our main results. We find that the directional changes 
in bank risk between top and bottom deciles is statistically significant (p-value < 10%). 
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 [Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Table 3 presents the results. We begin by discussing results from the OLS regressions 
presented in columns (1)-(3). In column (1) we find that the coefficient on CEO relative inside 
debt ratio is negative and statistically significant (p-value < 5%), which implies that higher CEO 
inside debt is associated with a loss in shareholder value following the announcement of a bank 
acquisition. By contrast, higher inside debt is positively and significantly associated with changes 
in debt value. These results indicate that abnormal returns to shareholders are negatively associated 
with our measures of inside debt, while abnormal returns to debtholders are positively related. A 
one standard deviation increase in CEO relative inside debt ratio results in reducing equity value 
by 91 basis points (column 1), while increasing debt value by 270 basis points (column 2). 
Next, we combine equity and debt CARs to examine the impact of CEO inside debt on total 
bank value using a method employed in Hilscher and Şişli-Ciamarra (2013). We compute changes 
in total bank value by weighting our previously computed equity CARs by market leverage 
(measured as the market value of equity divided by the sum of market values of equity and debt8) 
and our debt CARs by one minus market leverage9. As shown in column (3), we find no evidence 
that changes in total bank value are affected by CEO inside debt holdings. Taken together, the 
results indicate that inside debt promotes a wealth transfer from equity holders to debtholders, or 
a smaller transfer from debt to equity, with no effect on bank value overall.  
                                                             
8 Following Eisdorfer et al. (2013), we compute the market value of debt using the two-equation contingent claims 
model proposed by Ronn and Verma (1986). Please refer to Appendix C for a detailed discussion.  
9 Our results remain very similar if we use total bank value which is the sum of equity and debt CARs, without any 
weights.  
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The results thus far support our a priori expectation that inside debt results in closer alignment 
between managerial and debtholder interests. Specifically, debtholders perceive that CEOs with 
high inside debt pursue risk-reducing acquisitions that may well result in lower credit risk. By 
contrast, equity holders bear the expected costs of risk-reducing acquisitions and likely perceive 
such decisions to be a forgone opportunity to maximise the value of the financial safety net which 
subsidises risk-taking.  
Regarding other variables, we find that the percent of independent directors (%boardindep) is 
negatively associated with changes in equity value, potentially because independent directors may 
struggle to access detailed, accurate and timely information from managers (Armstrong et al., 
2014; Chen et al., 2015). This is also consistent with Pathan and Faff (2013) who show that 
increases in independent directors leads to declines in bank performance. In addition, we present 
tentative evidence that increases in the relative size of the deal are associated with positive 
abnormal returns to equity holders, implying that the merger may create economies of scale for 
the acquirer (Brewer and Jagtiani, 2013) and benefit from enhanced government safety net 
protection (Benston et al., 1995).  
So far we have discussed OLS results, presented in columns (1)-(3), which examine 
associations between CEO inside debt holdings and changes in bank equity, bank debt, and total 
bank value. However, a concern is that banks that choose to make an acquisition are not a random 
sample from the population of all banks. Our analysis therefore needs to be robust to such potential 
selection bias.  
We deal with self-selection bias by means of the Heckman (1979) two-stage method, and Table 
3 columns (4)-(6) repeat our OLS analysis ((columns (1)-(3)) but using the Heckman (1979) two-
stage framework. The first stage is a probit regression in which the dependent variable, Acqi,t, is 
19 
equal to one if bank i announces an acquisition in our sample in year t, and zero otherwise. We use 
the same explanatory variables in the probit regression as in our OLS regression model (bar deal-
specific controls)10.  
Our preferred instrument is ‘Historical Asset Growth’ (measured as historical three-year 
average growth of assets relative to the industry). A bank with low historical growth may be more 
likely to initiate acquisitions, but historical asset growth is unlikely to be associated with current 
merger-induced changes in bank risk11,12. Following the first-stage estimations, the second stage 
subsequently estimates the OLS regressions that explain acquisition-related changes in bank value 
or risk, with the additional term, the inverse Mills ratio li, included.  
The coefficient on li estimates the correlation between the error term of the relevant regression 
before adding li, and the expected value of the error term of the first-stage regression. Thus, the 
two-stage procedure controls for the possible impact on bank risk of the decision to make an 
acquisition13. We continue our analysis with the inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio obtained from 
the first-stage probit regression in order to control for selection bias. 
                                                             
10 To conduct the first-stage regression we use data from all publicly listed banks with financial data on FR-Y9C and 
market data from CRSP. We extract data on CEO compensation variables from Compustat’s Execucomp, which 
results in 98 banks (or, 551 bank-year observations) over our sample period. Bennett et al. (2015) note that the 
Execucomp sample is biased towards larger banks and hence we supplement this by extracting data from SNL 
Financial and by engaging in an extensive hand-collection effort for the remaining public US banks. This process 
results in a final sample consisting of 415 unique banks (or, 1821 bank-year observations), which is broadly consistent 
with Bennett et al. (2015) and van Bekkum (2016). 
11 Empirical evidence supports the assertion that pre- and post- merger asset growth rates exhibit no significant 
differences (e.g., Vennet, 1996). Similarly, Anand and Singh (1997) argue that the potential benefits of acquisitions 
should be independent of the firm's pre-merger growth rate. Since our dependent variable is designed to capture only 
changes in risk around acquisition window (and by extension because of the target’s characteristics), it is unlikely to 
be associated with historical asset growth. 
12 As shown in Appendix B we find that historical asset growth is negatively related to the probability of acquisitions. 
13 In unreported tests, we also conduct various sensitivity tests for our Heckman model by including our ‘Asset 
Growth’ variable in our second-stage regressions, but it is unable to explain acquirer returns or changes in risk. In 
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Columns (4)-(6) of Table 3 highlights that our main result with respect to the impact of CEO 
inside debt on wealth transfer between equity and bond holders around bank acquisitions continues 
to hold. That is, we find that CEO relative inside debt ratio is negatively (positively) associated 
with equity (debt CAR) in column (4) ((column (5)) and statistically significant (p-value < 1% in 
column (4) and p-value < 1% in column (5)).  
Taken together, our OLS and Heckman results in Table 3 indicate that CEO inside debt 
holdings are associated with a reduction in equity value but an increase in debtholder value. This 
supports our expectation that inside debt results in closer alignment between managerial and 
debtholder interests. Specifically, debtholders perceive that CEOs with high inside debt pursue 
risk-reducing acquisitions that may well result in lower credit risk. By contrast, equity holders bear 
the expected costs of risk-reducing acquisitions and likely perceive such decisions to be a forgone 
opportunity to maximise the value of the financial safety net which subsidises risk-taking.  
 
3.2 Inside debt and changes in bank risk: the realized risk implications of acquisitions 
 Section 3.1 found that inside debt is associated with acquisition announcement returns that are 
favourable to debtholders, but unfavourable to shareholders. This finding is indicative of investor 
expectations that investment decisions pursued by CEOs with high inside debt are aimed at 
reducing bank risk (Edmans and Liu, 2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011). If inside debt incentivizes 
CEOs to implement more conservative bank policies, we expect inside debt to be negatively 
associated with acquisition-related changes in bank risk following the completion of an 
acquisition.  
                                                             
addition, we confirm that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem in our Heckman setup because VIF for all of 
our regression models is below the threshold value of 10 where multicollinearity is regarded as high (Greene, 2008) 
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We specify the following regression to examine risk changes around acquisitions: 
 
∆Riski,t  = β0 + β1(CEO relative inside debt ratioi,t–1) + β2(Control variablesi,t–1) + β3(Ft) +  εi,t
                    (8) 
 
where ∆Riski,t is the change in DD, equity risk, or debt risk, computed as the difference in our risk 
variable measured over days 11 to 180 after the merger is completed and days 180 to 11 before the 
merger is announced, after adjusting for industry trends over the same period. Ft is a dummy 
variable equal to one each fiscal year t. A negative (positive) value of DD (Equity risk and Debt 
risk) implies an increase in bank risk.  
Table 4 presents the results of regressions which consider the risk implications of acquisitions 
in terms of distance-to-default, equity volatility and debt volatility. Across all models our measures 
of CEO inside debt are negatively associated with changes in bank risk, which supports the 
hypothesis that the CEO’s remuneration package affects the riskiness of the bank’s acquisitions14. 
For example, a one standard deviation increase in CEO relative inside debt ratio increases ∆DD 
by 0.159 units (in model 1). To put this into perspective, the mean level of DD before the merger 
is 0.694 units. Thus, on average, if relative inside debt is one standard deviation higher, default 
risk decreases by 22.9 percentage points, relative to its pre-merger value. This is an economically 
meaningful reduction in the acquirer’s default risk.  
 
                                                             
14 Throughout our analysis we include a comprehensive set of control variables identified by prior literature on the 
determinants of acquisition value and risk effects (Phan, 2014). However, other variables may be related to bank risk. 
In unreported tests we show that our results continue to hold when we control for additional features of banks that are 
related to bank risk ((see Bennett et al. (2015)): cash and items due from other banks, brokered deposits, loan loss 
reserves, non-performing assets, and securities held. 
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
 Together these findings confirm that bank CEO inside debt holdings are a key mechanism for 
helping to realign the implicit risk-taking incentives of bank CEOs with the interests of holders of 
debt and other bank stakeholders (Bennett et al., 2015; van Bekkum, 2016). 
3.3 Channels of risk reduction 
 This section explores relations between CEO inside debt and asset and leverage risk, two 
channels through which bank CEOs might affect risk when engaging in acquisitions. Prior research 
has shown that bank acquisitions often affect leverage and asset risk, although predictions differ 
about the direction of change (Benston et al., 1995; Akhavein et al., 1997; Demsetz and Strahan, 
1997). 
In contrast to estimations based on market-data, our measures Leverage Risk and Asset Risk 
measures are less sensitive to market sentiment and adverse market movements during the crisis. 
Specifically, the industry-adjusted asset and leverage ratios we employ will partly also reflect pre-
crisis risks. This is relevant since market-based indicators of financial stability have recently 
garnered widespread criticism in the post-financial crisis landscape because they vary considerably 
during crisis periods compared to normal economic conditions and may fail to capture underlying 
fundamentals during crisis periods. This could lead to an inaccurate assessment of banks’ key risks 
including default risk (Arregui et al., 2013). Therefore, estimations based on stock return volatility 
only may prove unreliable in periods such as the recent financial crisis risks.  
We follow convention in measuring leverage risk using the total risk-based capital ratio, 
defined as total equity capital expressed as a fraction of risk-weighted assets. We also follow 
convention in computing asset risk as the fraction of risk-weighted assets to total assets. Both these 
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measures are adjusted by industry averages for non-acquiring banks. The dependent variables are 
the measures of leverage and asset risk one quarter after completion of the takeover, less the 
relevant measure one quarter before the announcement.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 5 presents the results. In Panel A (Panel B), we find that CEO relative inside debt ratio 
is negatively (positively) and significantly related to Asset Risk (Leverage Risk) (p-value < 10% 
or less). The results suggest that the CEO’s incentive to take risk affects bank acquisition-related 
risk via both leverage and asset risk. This is pertinent since our measure of asset risk is used by 
bank regulators as a direct means of assessing bank portfolio risk. 
Having shown how inside debt holdings affect changes in leverage and asset risk, Table 5 also 
explores the channels of risk-reduction and assess how merger deal characteristics, including 
relative deal size and target-firm characteristics, influence acquisition-related changes in asset risk 
and leverage risk15. In Panel A, we find that the term CEO relative inside debt ratio * Relative Size 
is negative and statistically significant (p-value < 1%). This implies that high-inside-debt CEOs 
are more likely to pursue larger deals, which change a bank’s risk profile. We also find some 
evidence that high-inside-debt CEOs engage in diversifying acquisitions, and acquire a listed target 
to reduce asset risk. In Panel B, we highlight the positive and statistically significant interaction 
CEO relative inside debt ratio * Relative Size, which implies that relative size affects changes in 
asset and leverage risk for identically debt-incentivised CEOs. The negative and statistically 
                                                             
15 In unreported tests available on request, we also conducted sensitivity analysis, in which we show that inside debt 
is positively associated with changes in leverage risk components (changes in retained earnings and common equity) 
and positively associated with measures of asset quality (non-performing assets).  
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significant (p-value < 10%) coefficient on CEO relative inside debt ratio * Method of financing 
suggests that acquisitions by high-inside-debt CEOs when payment contains a larger proportion of 
stock financing are associated with reductions in leverage risk.  
Taken together, our results so far support the notion that high-inside-debt CEOs are associated 
with acquisitions that produce significant changes in a bank’s risk profile. 
 
4. Inside debt, takeovers, and the loss exposure of taxpayers 
In this section, we explore the implications of inside debt for taxpayers by considering the 
relationship between CEO inside debt and changes in the exposure of taxpayers to loss around 
bank acquisitions. Our investigation is timely, since in the wake of the 2007-2009 financial crisis 
much attention has been given to so-called excessive risk-taking by banking institutions and to 
huge taxpayer-funded bailouts. To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the first to 
directly consider the implications of CEO inside debt compensation for the financial benefits that 
bank shareholders can extract from the financial safety net. Our expectation here is that increases 
in CEO inside debt negatively influence the per-dollar amount that holders of bank equity can 
extract from the safety net.  
The presence of the safety net, in the form of explicit and implicit government guarantees of 
bank liabilities, implies that bank shareholders can shift risk to the government and taxpayers who 
underwrite the safety net (Ronn and Verma, 1986). Carbo-Valverde et al. (2012) present evidence 
that acquisitions can serve as a means by which banks engage in this form of risk-shifting. We take 
the enquiry further by testing whether inside debt is negatively related to the change in value of 
the bank’s safety net following an acquisition: 
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∆IPPi,t  = β0 + β1(CEO relative inside debt ratioi,t–1) + β2(Control variablesi,t–1) + β4(σA,t) + β5(Ft) 
+  εi,t                      (9) 
 
where ∆IPPi,t is the change in the industry-adjusted insurance price premium (IPP), σA,t is a bank’s 
portfolio risk (see below), and Ft is a dummy variable equal to one each fiscal year t. A positive 
value of ∆IPP implies that the value of the safety net increases after the acquisition. We estimate 
the value of IPP by means of the methodology in Merton (1977). By guaranteeing bank debt, the 
government implicitly writes a put option for the bank, whose value as a percentage of the bank’s 
debt can be expressed as: 
 
IPP  =  N(y + σA,t√T) – ((1 – δ)n (VA,t /Bt) N(y))         (10) 
y  =  (ln[B/VA,t(1 – δ)n] – σA,t2T/2)/σA,t√T),          (11) 
 
where Bt is the book value of liabilities, δ is the fraction of dividend to assets, n is the number of 
dividend payments per year, N(·) is the cumulative standard normal distribution, and T is set equal 
to one based on the assumption that bank deposits mature in the next year when a bank examination 
or audit occurs. The calculation of VA,t and σA,t is explained in Appendix C. Our measure of the 
change in the value of the safety net, ∆IPP, is the difference between the average IPP during days 
180 to 11 before the announcement, and days 11 to 180 after completion, less the changes in IPP 
due to general industry trends. We calculate general industry trends in IPP by means of a value-
weighted average IPP, over the same windows for each deal, across all banks on CRSP which did 
not engage in an acquisition.  
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[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
The results in Table 6 show that there is a significant negative relation between ∆IPP and CEO 
inside debt. This result is also significant in an economic sense. Specifically, one standard 
deviation increase in CEO relative inside debt ratio is associated with a relative decrease in the 
value of IPP of 10 basis points.  
The negative relation between ∆IPP and CEO inside debt implies that higher CEO inside debt 
results in a lower value extracted from the financial safety net. This finding is noteworthy because 
it suggests that the incentives resulting from the CEO’s remuneration not only affect a bank’s 
overall risk, as measured by distance to default and other measures, but also affect the expected 
value of the exposure to loss of taxpayers. Such exposure is a consequence of bank risk-taking that 
is of specific concern to regulators and governments, given a system in which the state protects 
retail depositors. Changes in taxpayer loss exposure are even more dramatic when banks have 
High IPP pre-acquisition, which is associated with a statistically significant reduction in post-
acquisition taxpayer exposure to loss. 
Regarding the control variables, it is interesting to note that bank size enters with a positive 
coefficient (significant at the 10% level)16. This indicates that larger banks extract more benefits 
from the safety net when engaging in acquisitions, which is broadly consistent with prior literature 
                                                             
16 Bennett et al. (2015) report that inside debt does not have significant effects on the risk of ‘mega’ banks. In 
unreported tests available on request, we run regressions on our measures of bank risk using a two-step Heckman 
estimator in which we introduce an interactive term between inside debt and pre-acquisition size of acquiring banks. 
We find that this interaction term is positive but not statistically significant at conventional levels, thereby suggesting 
that bank size pre-acquisition does not significantly affect the sensitivity of changes in bank risk to CEO inside debt. 
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(John et al., 1991; Benston et al., 1995). Also, banks with higher Pre-merger Asset Volatility 
pursue acquisitions that are associated with increases in post-acquisition IPP. 
 
5. Additional tests 
5.1 Endogenous CEO pay? 
It is possible that CEO pay is endogenous with respect to acquisition risk. CEOs might 
negotiate their compensation arrangements in anticipation of pursuing an acquisition in the future. 
For instance, in anticipation of a risk-decreasing acquisition, a CEO might negotiate a higher 
fraction of compensation to be paid in the form of inside debt. Similarly, boards may preempt 
possible erosion of shareholder value following acquisitions by high inside debt CEOs, by 
adjusting CEO pay to mitigate possible future wealth transfer from equity holders to bond holders. 
In these scenarios, it is not inside debt that is causing the CEO to undertake a risk-reducing 
acquisition, and our estimates above would be biased.  
To buttress a causal interpretation of our results, with respect to the impact of CEO inside debt 
on changes in value and risk, we run regressions that explicitly control for endogeneity using a 
Two-Stage least squares (2SLS) regression framework. Our instruments are average CEO pay 
incentives at a peer group of publicly listed U.S. banks which are in the same size quartile as the 
acquiring bank.  
 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
Our choice of instruments is based on the view that the variable should be correlated with 
acquiring bank pay incentives but not have a direct impact on the merger-induced change in bank 
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risk17. The rationale behind these instruments is as follows. If firms design executives’ pay 
incentives by benchmarking their pay against that of peers (Bouwman, 2012; Gande and Kalpathy, 
2017), we can expect the level and structure of peer group compensation to be associated with 
acquiring bank CEO pay. Since board of directors have little control over the external pay of peer 
groups, pay practices at peer institutions should not be related to the acquisition-related change in 
bank risk at an acquiring bank, apart from the effect that peer pay has on setting the CEO 
compensation package at the acquiring bank.  
A potential further concern is that the banks in our peer group may also have similar risk 
profiles, which may be associated with acquiring firm risk. It is therefore worth highlighting that 
our dependent variable is industry-adjusted, and so is designed to remove any variation in risk that 
is due to system-wide changes over a portfolio of non-acquiring peer banks.  
The results shown in Table 7 are consistent with our prior analysis18. CEO relative inside debt 
ratio has the expected sign and is statistically significant at p-value < 10% level or better in three 
out of seven specifications.  
 
5.2  Do deviations from an optimal level of CEO inside debt levels explain our results? 
Our prior findings highlight that inside debt is positively associated with changes in debt value, 
but negatively associated with changes in equity value around acquisitions. Campbell et al. (2016) 
                                                             
17 Peer-based remuneration measures have recently been used as an instrument for CEO remuneration by several other 
authors (e.g., Cassell et al., 2012; Kini and Williams, 2012). Moreover, remuneration practices at a peer group of 
similar companies are an important determinant of a given CEO’s remuneration (Faulkender and Yang, 2010). 
18 In our first-stage results, peer inside debt compensation has the expected sign and is statistically significant at p-
value < 5% level or better.  
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adopt an optimal contracting view and suggest that investor reactions to CEO inside debt holdings 
may be conditional on the deviation of inside debt ratios from the optimal level. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Our empirical setup involves estimating optimal inside debt ratios and examining which 
component (optimal or deviation) explains the value effects of M&A. We obtain the optimal inside 
debt ratios from the predicted values obtained by regressing inside debt on its determinants, 
following Campbell et al. (2016). Results reported in Table 8 indicate that the deviation component 
of inside debt ratios explains the M&A value effects, with banks that have higher inside debt than 
optimal associated with more negative shareholder returns and positive bondholder returns. This 
finding further reaffirms our paper’s view of the wealth transfer explanation since banks where 
CEOs have higher inside debt ratios than optimal may be more likely to pursue deals that transfer 
wealth from shareholders to creditors.   
5.3 Which components of inside debt drive changes in risk and value? 
Previous studies decompose inside debt into a pension component and a deferred compensation 
component and find that most of the effect of inside debt is driven by the pension component (e.g., 
Anantharaman et al., 2013). We conduct sensitivity analysis in which we examine the incremental 
impact of the components of debt-like compensation (pension benefits and deferred compensation) 
on bank risk and value. While both components exhibit debt-like features, pension benefits in the 
form of SERP are largely unsecured and unfunded obligations while deferred compensation may 
still allow executives to partially cash out before retirement (Wei and Yermack, 2011; 
Anantharaman et al., 2013). 
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[Insert Table 9 here]  
 
As a next step, we introduce both components in regression models presented in Table 9. Our 
results indicate that the conservative behavior of executives induced by inside debt is largely 
driven by the pension component, which is consistent with Anantharaman et al. (2013). 
 
5.4 Controlling for Chief Financial Officer (CFO) inside debt  
Given the importance of a Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in determining the level and nature 
of bank risk-taking (Kim et al., 2011; Anatharaman and Lee, 2014), we conduct sensitivity 
analyses in which we control for the inside debt of bank CFOs. To do so, we extend our dataset on 
CEO compensation to include CFO pay.  
We source the additional data from Execucomp (available for 545 bank-year observations, 
including 65 bank-year observations for our acquisition sample) and by hand-collecting the 
remaining data (1,129 bank-year observations, including 33 observations for our acquisition 
sample) from DEF 14A proxy statements. This data collection effort allows us to construct a new 
variable: CFO relative inside debt ratio. 
 
[Insert Table 10 here]  
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The results in Table 10 show that our key results for the association between CEO inside debt 
and changes in value and risk continue to hold, even after accounting for CFO incentives. This can 
be attributed to the fact that CEOs play a prominent role in deal negotiations and merger 
characteristics (Graham, et al., 2015; Cain and McKeon, 2016). 
 
5.5 Are crisis deals different? 
Many deals in our sample took place during the recent financial crisis period, which was a 
period with substantial market turmoil. We therefore check whether there are differential effects 
of inside debt on acquirer shareholder value for deals undertaken during crisis vs. non-crisis years. 
Recent research finds that inside debt is positively related to firm value during the crisis period 
(e.g., Bennett et al., 2015; van Bekkum, 2016). In unreported tests, we find that that the interaction 
term between inside debt and crisis years (2008-09) is not statistically significant in our changes-
in-value and changes-in-risk regressions.  
However, it may be argued that since estimation windows for our risk measures may overlap 
with the crisis period, this may result in abnormally large shifts in our dependent variables. To 
address this concern, in unreported results we re-estimate our main regressions after excluding all 
bank-year observations where the estimation windows during the pre-acquisition or post-
acquisition period overlap with the peak of the crisis. We follow Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) 
in computing the banking crisis window as August 2008 till December 2008. Our findings are 
robust to these changes. Further, we also confirm that our results remain qualitatively similar if we 
start our crisis window from March 2008 (when Bear Stearns collapsed) or July 2008 (when the 
SEC announced a naked short selling ban on some financial sector stocks). 
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5.6 Other tests 
 We carry out several further final robustness tests in this section. First, the banking literature 
on M&A argues that financial distress can be a motive for bank mergers that are caused by the 
weak financial position of the target. These mergers can often be an outcome of regulatory 
encouragement to take over weaker targets in order to avoid the large social costs associated with 
a bank failure. The CEO’s discretion over bank policy in motivating such acquisitions would be 
limited in these cases. To exclude deals with possible weak target banks, we exclude all deals 
completed during the financial crisis (2008-09), and any other deals where the target received 
funds under the capital assistance program (TARP), or was listed as failed in the FDIC database, 
or where the takeover premium19 was negative.  
Second, it can be argued that FDIC-insured deposit holders will be in a better position to protect 
themselves from potential losses than uninsured creditors of the bank. In this case, the impact of 
any policies that transfer wealth from creditors mainly affects the wealth of uninsured creditors, 
including the CEO. So, for the purpose of scaling of the relative inside debt ratio ((equation (3)), 
we exclude the amount of insured deposits from Bank debt. 
Third, since prior literature on the impact of M&As on firm value and risk changes identifies 
that method of payment can affect merger changes in risk and value (e.g., Ongena and Penas, 2009; 
Phan, 2014), we follow Phan (2014) in examining the relationship between inside debt and 
methods of payment by running a Tobit model in which the dependent variable is the percentage 
of deal financed with equity. We find that the coefficients on inside debt and other CEO pay 
                                                             
19 Brown and Dinç (2011) highlight a too-many-to-fail effect where poor industry conditions in the form of low capital 
ratios may give rise to more acquisitions of weaker targets due to regulatory forbearance. In additional sensitivity 
analysis, we run regressions which exclude any deals involving distressed targets, and confirm that our findings remain 
very similar.   
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variables are not statistically significant at conventional levels, indicating that differences in CEO 
compensation do not explain differences in deal payment consideration. 
Fourth, throughout our analysis we follow convention in the literature in using CEO relative 
inside debt ratio. To test whether our results are sensitive to this measure, we repeat our main 
analysis using the simple CEO inside debt, without scaling by her bank’s debt-to-equity ratio. Our 
results are qualitatively unchanged. 
Fifth, we perform a variety of additional checks to ensure that our results are robust to outliers. 
Specifically, we follow van Bekkum (2016) and others by taking the log transformation of CEO 
inside debt and other CEO pay measures to mitigate the impact of extreme values in our sample. 
We confirm that our results remain qualitatively unchanged with the log transformation. Next, we 
confirm that our results hold if we winsorize the sample at top and bottom 5%. These results are 
shown in Panel B. Finally, we adopt a robust regression approach to account for outliers that use 
weights based on the influence of potential outliers. Our results continue to hold throughout these 
approaches. These are available from the authors upon request. 
6. Conclusion 
 The structure of CEO pay is an important determinant of bank risk-taking behavior, which has 
potential implications for shareholders, debtholders, and taxpayers. It is now a widely-held view 
that the large losses at some banks during the recent financial crisis were at least in part the 
outcome of compensation contracts which tied the wealth of senior bank executives to excessive 
risk-taking. We suggest one solution to mitigate risk-taking behavior may be to calibrate CEO 
wealth more closely to that of creditors. In this paper, we consider the efficacy of CEO inside debt 
in incentivizing CEOs to pursue conservative bank policies.  
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We use acquisitions by banks to test the link between CEO inside debt and bank policy 
regarding risk. Consistent with the view that inside debt helps align the interests of managers and 
debtholders, we find that inside debt is associated with positive returns for debtholders but negative 
returns for shareholders immediately following the announcement of M&A deals. Since we do not 
find that CEO inside debt affects changes in total bank value, we argue that inside debt promotes 
a wealth transfer between shareholders and debtholders when CEOs engage in acquisitions. Our 
results also show a negative relation between CEO inside debt and realized changes in bank risk 
and extraction of smaller benefits from the financial safety net.  
Our results have important implications for bank management, investors, and bank supervision 
and regulatory policy. We find that high inside debt holdings mitigate CEO incentives to engage 
in heightened and potentially excessive bank risk-taking. The results support the view that it is 
beneficial, to creditors and taxpayers, for CEO compensation incentives to be aligned with those 
of bank creditors. Our findings, with respect to the function of inside debt in mitigating CEO risk-
taking incentives, are especially meaningful given recent criticisms of so-called excessive bank 
risk-taking, and specifically the role of implicit CEO compensation incentives in exacerbating risk-
taking behavior (Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010). 
Finally, our results carry further weight given post financial crisis legislative changes, which 
have focused on reforms to bankers’ pay. Notably, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act), mandates that all financial institutions ensure 
that compensation arrangements are not unduly risk-rewarding. Taken together, the findings in 
this paper demonstrate that inside debt is a vital component of CEO compensation contract design; 
we advocate a more widespread use of inside debt in bank executives’ remuneration contracts. 
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Figure 1: Default risk before and after acquisition, for banks with high and low CEO inside debt. Acquisition 
risk on the vertical axis is measured by ∆Distance-to-default (DD). The circles (diamonds) show mean daily DD for 
the sample of acquiring banks in the top (bottom) quartile by CEO relative inside debt. The pre-acquisition window 
ends 11 days before the first announcement of the acquisition; the post-acquisition window starts 11 days after the 
announcement that the deal has been completed.  
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Table 1 This table shows the sample distribution of acquisitions by 62 unique banks from 2007-2012 in Panel A and correlation coefficients for key variables in 
Panel B.  
Panel A: Sample Distribution.  
Year N % 
2007 40 39.60 
2008 19 18.81 
2009 7 6.93 
2010 12 11.88 
2011 10 9.90 
2012 13 12.87 
Total 101 100 
Panel B: Correlation Table for Key Variables 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Equity CAR 1.000                
(2) Debt CAR -0.077 1.000               
(3) Total CAR -0.105 0.848 1.000              
(4) ∆Distance-to-Default 0.018 0.170 0.136 1.000             
(5) ∆Equity risk  0.019 -0.138 -0.194 -0.544 1.000            
(6) ∆Debt risk -0.032 -0.002 0.113 -0.446 0.241 1.000           
(7) ∆Leverage Risk 0.126 -0.111 -0.191 -0.110 0.126 -0.176 1.000          
(8) ∆Asset Risk -0.200 0.024 0.106 0.124 -0.038 -0.021 -0.355 1.000         
(9) ∆IPP -0.103 0.275 0.325 -0.049 0.120 0.458 -0.107 0.123 1.000        
(10) CEO relative inside debt ratio -0.143 0.111 0.060 0.135 -0.208 -0.171 0.016 -0.154 -0.109 1.000       
(11) CEO vega 0.067 0.073 0.028 -0.245 0.254 -0.155 0.119 -0.070 0.022 -0.042 1.000      
(12) CEO delta 0.042 0.005 0.026 -0.117 0.105 -0.150 0.095 0.098 0.002 -0.213 0.514 1.000     
(13) Ln(Assets) 0.076 0.046 -0.021 -0.188 0.234 -0.043 0.203 -0.153 0.039 -0.062 0.702 0.548 1.000    
(14) Charter value -0.038 0.067 0.020 0.374 -0.139 -0.369 -0.049 0.047 0.185 0.112 0.048 0.047 -0.069 1.000   
(15) Net income/Assets -0.054 0.062 0.130 0.200 -0.075 -0.175 -0.030 0.144 0.191 0.100 -0.028 0.051 -0.106 0.589 1.000  
(16) Equity/Assets 0.118 -0.128 -0.076 -0.025 -0.209 0.127 -0.268 0.028 0.006 0.039 -0.405 -0.323 -0.576 -0.110 -0.116 1.00 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics. The sample includes 101 acquisitions by 62 banks over the period 2007 to 2012. All 
variables are described in Appendix A.  
 Mean 
 
Minimum 
25th 
percentile Median 
75th 
percentile 
 
Maximum 
Standard 
deviation 
Risk variables        
Equity CAR -0.011 -0.063 -0.035 -0.018 0.015 0.054 0.035 
Debt CAR -0.053 -0.325 -0.113 -0.005 0.038 0.101 0.128 
Total CAR -0.096 -1.036 -0.104 -0.008 0.028 0.144 0.268 
∆Distance-to-
Default -0.365 -2.648 -0.613 -0.342 0.248 2.056 1.091 
∆Equity risk 0.077 -1.893 -0.268 -0.001 0.270 3.024 0.764 
∆Debt risk 0.041 -2.377 -1.097 0.324 1.078 2.760 1.224 
∆IPP 0.229 -1.587 -0.162 0.156 0.689 1.812 0.816 
CEO Pay variables        
CEO relative inside 
debt ratio 0.070 0.000 0.003 0.045 0.092 0.525 0.087 
CEO vega 0.135 0.000 0.013 0.034 0.094 0.750 0.218 
CEO delta 0.514 0.008 0.058 0.158 0.465 4.401 0.899 
Other controls        
Ln(Assets) 16.429 13.191 14.855 15.776 18.244 21.500 2.243 
Net income/Assets 0.961 -0.510 0.798 1.025 1.214 1.576 0.415 
Charter value 1.558 0.496 1.139 1.495 2.004 3.088 0.575 
Equity/Assets 8.643 6.190 7.470 8.590 9.670 12.960 1.587 
CEO is chair 0.545 0 0 1 1 1 0.500 
%boardindep 0.867 0.714 0.833 0.889 0.917 0.944 0.064 
Board size 13.020 7 11 13 16 20 3.194 
Ln(CEO age) 4.016 3.689 3.931 4.025 4.111 4.304 0.112 
Relative size 0.135 0.008 0.034 0.096 0.197 0.364 0.118 
Method of financing 0.413 0 0 0.314 1 1 0.404 
Diversifying 
takeover 0.693 0 0 1 1 1 - 
Private target 0.238 0 0 0 0 1 - 
Macro conditions 1.468 1.219 1.366 1.428 1.536 1.892 0.136 
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Table 3: Changes in equity value around acquisitions and CEO inside debt. The dependent variable is the 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for equity estimated over a -2 to +2 window centred on the acquisition 
announcement in columns (1) and (4); the CAR for debt estimated over the same window, following Eisdorfer et al. 
(2013), in columns (2) and (5); and the weighted average of equity CAR and debt CAR in columns (3) and (6), where 
the weight for equity is the market value of equity divided by the sum of market value of equity and market value of 
debt, and the weight for debt is one minus the weight for equity, following Hilscher and Şişli-Ciamarra (2013). We 
control for selection bias using Heckman’s two-step estimator by including the inverse Mills ratio, Lambda, obtained 
from the first-stage probit regression (Appendix B). All variable definitions are given in Appendix A. Year fixed 
effects are included and robust standard errors clustered by bank are presented in parentheses. * (**) (***) = significant 
at 10% (5%) (1%) level. 
 Equity 
CAR 
Debt 
CAR 
Wt. Avg. 
CAR 
 Equity 
CAR 
Debt 
CAR 
Wt. Avg. 
CAR 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
CEO relative inside debt ratio -0.104** 0.309* 0.492  -0.115*** 0.280** 0.459 
 (0.040) (0.160) (0.359)  (0.034) (0.130) (0.307) 
CEO vega 0.008 0.043 0.157  0.008 0.063 0.178 
 (0.025) (0.107) (0.269)  (0.023) (0.097) (0.237) 
CEO delta -0.005 0.009 0.032  -0.005* 0.011 0.035 
 (0.004) (0.025) (0.048)  (0.003) (0.021) (0.040) 
Ln(Assets) 0.005 0.001 -0.012  0.005 -0.001 -0.014 
 (0.004) (0.012) (0.032)  (0.003) (0.012) (0.030) 
Net income/Assets 0.008 0.004 0.074  0.018 0.012 0.088 
 (0.011) (0.049) (0.112)  (0.011) (0.059) (0.125) 
Charter value 0.008 -0.020 -0.056  0.005 -0.028 -0.068 
 (0.010) (0.036) (0.084)  (0.009) (0.031) (0.076) 
Equity/Assets 0.005* -0.015 -0.025  0.004 -0.016* -0.026 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.021)  (0.002) (0.009) (0.020) 
High return 0.011 0.027 0.090  0.011 0.022 0.032 
 (0.008) (0.029) (0.108)  (0.008) (0.026) (0.100) 
CEO is chair -0.004 -0.008 -0.007  -0.003 0.003 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.034) (0.088)  (0.006) (0.032) (0.083) 
%boardindep -0.100** 0.141 0.357  -0.086** 0.242 0.485 
 (0.049) (0.244) (0.517)  (0.044) (0.210) (0.464) 
Board size 0.002 -0.010* -0.015  0.002 -0.011** -0.017** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.010)  (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) 
Ln(CEO age) 0.041 -0.050 -0.183  0.046 -0.047 -0.182 
 (0.031) (0.153) (0.301)  (0.030) (0.136) (0.267) 
Relative size 0.087** -0.047 -0.353  0.084** -0.034 -0.326 
 (0.041) (0.137) (0.315)  (0.035) (0.114) (0.257) 
Method of financing 0.019 -0.003 -0.110  0.018 -0.014 -0.128* 
 (0.013) (0.040) (0.092)  (0.012) (0.033) (0.076) 
Diversifying takeover -0.009 -0.019 -0.055  -0.010 -0.021 -0.058 
 (0.008) (0.029) (0.049)  (0.007) (0.025) (0.044) 
Private target 0.005 0.019 0.018  0.005 0.025 0.031 
 (0.008) (0.034) (0.068)  (0.007) (0.029) (0.059) 
Macro conditions -0.020 0.104 0.153  -0.022 0.106 0.165 
 (0.022) (0.089) (0.183)  (0.018) (0.079) (0.159) 
Lambda     0.006 0.002 0.008 
     (0.005) (0.025) (0.061) 
Observations 101 101 101  99 99 99 
R2 0.280 0.211 0.197  0.269 0.231 0.209 
44 
Table 4: Changes in risk around acquisitions and CEO inside debt. The dependent variable is ∆Bank risk, 
computed using ∆Distance-to-Default in columns (1) and (4), ∆Equity risk in columns (2) and (5), and ∆Debt Risk in 
columns (3) and (6). ∆Distance-to-Default is the average daily distance-to-default (DD) value of the acquirer (equation 
(1)) from 11 to 180 trading days after completion is announced, less the average from 180 to 11 days before the deal 
is announced, after subtracting the value-weighted average DD score over the same windows across non-acquiring 
banks on CRSP. ∆Equity Risk is the standard deviation of daily equity (debt) returns of the acquirer from 11 to 180 
trading days after completion is announced, less the average from 180 to 11 days before the deal is announced, after 
subtracting the value-weighted average equity volatility over the same windows across non-acquiring banks on CRSP. 
We control for selection bias using Heckman’s two-step estimator by including the inverse Mills ratio obtained from 
the first-stage probit regression. All variable definitions are given in Appendix A. Year fixed effects are included. 
Robust standard errors clustered by bank are in parentheses. * (**) (***) = significant at 10% (5%) (1%) level. 
 ∆Distance-to-
Default  
∆Equity 
risk 
∆Debt 
risk 
 ∆Distance-to-
Default 
∆Equity 
risk 
∆Debt 
risk 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
CEO relative inside debt 
ratio 
1.819* -1.701** -1.812*  2.271** -1.693*** -2.110** 
 (1.039) (0.713) (1.011)  (0.961) (0.605) (0.871) 
CEO vega -1.071*** 0.668** -0.419  -1.254*** 0.795*** -0.394 
 (0.392) (0.320) (0.439)  (0.340) (0.265) (0.343) 
CEO delta 0.166 -0.123* -0.094  0.170** -0.104 -0.102 
 (0.103) (0.070) (0.081)  (0.087) (0.065) (0.070) 
Ln(Assets) 0.020 0.000 0.112**  0.034 -0.026 0.108** 
 (0.078) (0.064) (0.054)  (0.073) (0.057) (0.049) 
Net income/Assets 0.054 -0.249 -0.042  -0.331 -0.439** 0.120 
 (0.270) (0.168) (0.351)  (0.305) (0.184) (0.285) 
Charter value 0.408 -0.289 0.245  0.587*** -0.282 0.177 
 (0.256) (0.200) (0.218)  (0.226) (0.173) (0.197) 
Equity/Assets -0.050 -0.018 0.137**  -0.016 0.008 0.118** 
 (0.077) (0.054) (0.060)  (0.067) (0.046) (0.055) 
High risk 1.177*** -0.582*** -0.986***  1.038*** -0.587*** -
0.958*** 
 (0.289) (0.197) (0.236)  (0.240) (0.174) (0.211) 
CEO is chair -0.009 -0.062 0.060  -0.126 0.005 0.096 
 (0.260) (0.176) (0.191)  (0.231) (0.146) (0.168) 
%boardindep -1.006 0.178 0.205  -2.059 0.394 0.612 
 (1.884) (1.304) (1.153)  (1.602) (1.171) (1.094) 
Board size 0.025 -0.006 0.009  0.035 -0.013 0.006 
 (0.037) (0.023) (0.027)  (0.031) (0.022) (0.023) 
Ln(CEO age) -1.236 0.631 -0.582  -1.497 0.616 -0.463 
 (1.259) (0.797) (0.803)  (1.024) (0.722) (0.704) 
Relative size 1.371 -0.045 -0.341  1.468* 0.081 -0.346 
 (1.026) (1.011) (0.832)  (0.882) (0.908) (0.739) 
Method of financing 0.396* -0.418** -0.120  0.507*** -0.410** -0.147 
 (0.233) (0.203) (0.219)  (0.189) (0.180) (0.198) 
Diversifying takeover -0.183 0.087 -0.251  -0.139 0.096 -0.279* 
 (0.198) (0.172) (0.183)  (0.169) (0.150) (0.162) 
Private target -0.018 -0.373* -0.137  -0.026 -0.345* -0.137 
 (0.308) (0.222) (0.207)  (0.267) (0.191) (0.184) 
Macro conditions 0.067 0.082 0.259  0.148 0.124 0.225 
 (0.691) (0.462) (0.508)  (0.625) (0.407) (0.426) 
Lambda     -0.216** -0.152** 0.108 
     (0.108) (0.073) (0.134) 
Observations 101 101 100  99 99 99 
R2 0.503 0.368 0.726  0.502 0.364 0.718 
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Table 5: Changes in asset risk and leverage risk, and CEO inside debt. The dependent variable in Panel A is Asset Risk, measured as the change in risk-
weighted assets to total assets. The dependent variable in Panel B is leverage risk, measured as the industry-adjusted change in total equity capital to risk-weighted 
assets. We control for selection bias using Heckman’s two-step estimator by including the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the first-stage probit regression. All 
variable definitions are given in Appendix A. Year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors clustered by bank are in parentheses. * (**) (***) = significant 
at 10% (5%) (1%) level. 
Panel A: Asset risk (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO relative inside debt ratio -0.143* -0.120* 0.052 -0.216** -0.045 -0.190** 
 (0.085) (0.068) (0.084) (0.095) (0.069) (0.079) 
CEO relative inside debt ratio * Relative size   -0.996***    
   (0.377)    
CEO relative inside debt ratio * Method of financing     0.178   
    (0.131)   
CEO relative inside debt ratio * Diversifying takeover     -0.179*  
     (0.101)  
CEO relative inside debt ratio * Private target      0.168* 
      (0.100) 
Relative size -0.073 -0.076 0.046 -0.071 -0.096* -0.074 
 (0.065) (0.053) (0.032) (0.052) (0.054) (0.053) 
Method of financing 0.003 -0.001 -0.016 -0.027 -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) 
Diversifying takeover -0.023 -0.015 -0.016 -0.004 0.009 -0.004 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) 
Private target  -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.012 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) 
CEO vega 0.030 0.020 -0.003 0.017 0.025 0.020 
 (0.043) (0.038) (0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
CEO delta 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Lambda  -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 101 99 99 99 99 99 
R2 0.313 0.282 0.404 0.392 0.382 0.379 
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Panel B: Leverage risk  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO relative inside debt ratio 0.029* 0.032** -0.014 0.052** 0.028** 0.024 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.013) (0.017) 
CEO relative inside debt ratio * Relative size   0.197**    
   (0.087)    
CEO relative inside debt ratio * Method of financing     -0.062*   
    (0.035)   
CEO relative inside debt ratio * Diversifying takeover     -0.016  
     (0.021)  
CEO relative inside debt ratio * Private target      -0.005 
      (0.019) 
Relative size 0.006 -0.003 -0.011 -0.009 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
Method of financing 0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Diversifying takeover 0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Private target  -0.001 -0.002 0.005 0.005* 0.004 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
CEO vega -0.011 -0.015* -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
CEO delta 0.007 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lambda  0.010** 0.009** 0.007* 0.009** 0.010** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 101 99 99 99 99 99 
R2 0.338 0.259 0.285 0.224 0.252 0.249 
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Table 6: Changes in taxpayer loss exposure around acquisitions and CEO inside debt. The dependent variable is 
∆IPP, given by the average IPP between days 11 to 180 after completion less the average during days 180 to 11 before 
the announcement, less the value-weighted average IPP, over the same windows for each deal across all non-acquiring 
banks on CRSP. ∆IPP is expressed in percentage points for ease of interpretation. We control for selection bias using 
Heckman’s two-step estimator by including the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the first-stage probit regression. All 
variable definitions are given in Appendix A. Year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors clustered by 
bank are in parentheses. * (**) (***) = significant at 10% (5%) (1%) level. 
 (1) (2) 
CEO relative inside debt ratio -1.191*** -1.247*** 
 (0.326) (0.295) 
CEO vega 0.196 0.211 
 (0.279) (0.229) 
CEO delta -0.067 -0.067 
 (0.047) (0.044) 
Ln(Assets) 0.066* 0.065* 
 (0.035) (0.037) 
Net income/Assets 0.044 0.066 
 (0.120) (0.118) 
Charter value -0.136 -0.148 
 (0.114) (0.108) 
Equity/Assets 0.021 0.020 
 (0.032) (0.031) 
High IPP -0.362*** -0.360*** 
 (0.114) (0.102) 
CEO is chair -0.120 -0.105 
 (0.115) (0.117) 
%boardindep 0.501 0.626 
 (0.463) (0.414) 
Board size 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
Ln(CEO age) 0.387 0.404 
 (0.404) (0.342) 
Relative size 0.253 0.267 
 (0.478) (0.439) 
Method of financing -0.002 -0.012 
 (0.092) (0.077) 
Diversifying takeover 0.079 0.073 
 (0.079) (0.069) 
Private target -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.098) (0.086) 
Macro conditions -0.102 -0.102 
 (0.216) (0.188) 
Pre-merger Asset Volatility 0.118*** 0.117*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) 
Lambda  0.012 
  (0.091) 
Observations 101 99 
R2 0.849 0.847 
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Table 7: Change in bank risk and CEO inside debt controlling for potential endogeneity of CEO remuneration. 
This table shows second-stage results from a two-stage regression framework using the predicted values of CEO 
relative inside debt ratio and CEO vega and CEO delta from the first stage. The dependent variable is change in bank 
value or change in bank risk. Robust standard errors clustered by bank are in parentheses. All models include year 
fixed effects. * (**) (***) = significant at 10% (5%) (1%) level. 
 Equity 
CAR 
Debt 
CAR 
Total 
CAR 
∆DD ∆Equity 
risk 
∆Debt 
risk 
∆IPP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Instrumented CEO relative inside debt ratio 0.019 0.198 1.262 8.990* -6.629* 4.874 -3.491* 
 (0.148) (0.527) (4.824) (5.395) (3.616) (3.794) (1.857) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 
Hausman endogeneity test (p-value) 0.402 0.838 0.849 0.198 0.181 0.050 0.167 
Underidentification test (p-value) 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.003 
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Table 8: Changes in bank value and risk, and CEO inside debt. This table shows the results using optimal contracting inside debt variables, as in Campbell et 
al. (2016). We obtain Optimal (CEO Inside Debt) as fitted values from running a panel regression where dependent variable is CEO inside debt ratio and firm-
level and executive-level determinants. Deviation (CEO Inside Debt) is the difference between CEO inside debt ratio and optimal CEO inside debt ratio. We control 
for selection bias using Heckman’s two-step estimator by including the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the first-stage probit regression. All variable definitions 
are given in Appendix A. Year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors clustered by bank are in parentheses. * (**) (***) = significant at 10% (5%) (1%) 
level. 
 Equity CAR Debt CAR Wt. Avg CAR ∆Distance-to-Default ∆Equity risk ∆Debt risk ∆IPP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Optimal (CEO relative inside debt ratio) -0.194 0.938 1.809 6.275 -10.123*** 1.130 -4.857*** 
 (0.163) (0.954) (2.163) (4.638) (3.530) (2.941) (1.878) 
Deviation (CEO relative inside debt ratio) -0.113*** 0.416** 0.605 3.218*** -2.665*** -2.414** -1.594*** 
 (0.041) (0.171) (0.392) (1.146) (0.698) (1.150) (0.349) 
CEO vega 0.004 0.072 0.176 1.013*** 0.733*** -0.522 0.190 
 (0.024) (0.095) (0.236) (0.336) (0.225) (0.332) (0.229) 
CEO delta -0.004 0.013 0.038 -0.164** -0.131** -0.075 -0.069* 
 (0.003) (0.021) (0.042) (0.074) (0.062) (0.066) (0.041) 
Lambda 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.213* -0.161* 0.105 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.025) (0.060) (0.115) (0.087) (0.128) (0.089) 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
R2 0.255 0.248 0.216 0.504 0.397 0.721 0.856 
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Table 9: Changes in bank value and risk, and CEO inside debt: Components of Inside Debt. The table shows estimation results using components of inside 
debt, where CEO Pension-based inside debt is defined as the ratio of CEO pension benefits to CEO equity-based compensation scaled by the firm debt-to-equity 
ratio, and CEO deferred pay-based inside debt is defined as the ratio of CEO deferred compensation to CEO equity-based compensation scaled by the firm debt-
to-equity ratio. We control for selection bias using Heckman’s two-step estimator by including the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the first-stage probit regression. 
All variable definitions are given in Appendix A. Year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors clustered by bank are in parentheses. * (**) (***) = 
significant at 10% (5%) (1%) level. 
 Equity CAR Debt CAR Wt. Avg CAR ∆Distance-to-Default ∆Equity risk ∆Debt risk ∆IPP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CEO Pension-based inside debt -0.124** 0.356** 0.516 2.104* -2.020*** -1.474* -1.659*** 
 (0.044) (0.171) (0.360) (1.278) (0.636) (0.830) (0.378) 
CEO Deferred Pay-based inside debt -0.204 -0.204 0.142 4.145 0.418 -5.492* 1.209 
 (0.440) (0.440) (0.806) (3.631) (2.432) (3.186) (1.066) 
CEO vega 0.007 0.064 0.163 1.468*** 0.788*** -0.378 0.207 
 (0.023) (0.100) (0.247) (0.366) (0.262) (0.346) (0.215) 
CEO delta 0.005* 0.012 0.037 -0.100 -0.109 -0.095 -0.073 
 (0.003) (0.022) (0.040) (0.121) (0.067) (0.069) (0.045) 
Lambda 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.304** -0.155** 0.115 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.025) (0.059) (0.130) (0.075) (0.137) (0.089) 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
R2 0.273 0.237 0.209 0.383 0.366 0.722 0.851 
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Table 10: Changes in bank value and risk, and CEO inside debt: Controlling for CFO inside debt incentives. This table shows the estimation results after 
controlling for CFO inside debt incentives. We control for selection bias using Heckman’s two-step estimator by including the inverse Mills ratio obtained from 
the first-stage probit regression. All variable definitions are given in Appendix A. Year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors clustered by bank are in 
parentheses. * (**) (***) = significant at 10% (5%) (1%) level. 
 Equity CAR Debt CAR Wt. Avg CAR ∆Distance-to-Default ∆Equity risk ∆Debt risk ∆IPP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CEO relative inside debt ratio -0.109*** 0.278** 0.432 1.981** -1.666*** -2.023** -1.150*** 
 (0.035) (0.129) (0.306) (0.967) (0.640) (0.907) (0.274) 
CFO relative inside debt ratio -0.047 0.213 0.356 2.807** -0.366 -0.722 -0.838 
 (0.047) (0.205) (0.403) (1.171) (1.076) (1.474) (0.549) 
CEO vega 0.010 -0.050 -0.069 -0.874*** 0.348** -0.233 -0.028 
 (0.012) (0.072) (0.156) (0.234) (0.164) (0.185) (0.167) 
CEO delta -0.006** 0.024 0.059 0.182 -0.121* -0.091 -0.055 
 (0.003) (0.023) (0.048) (0.124) (0.069) (0.078) (0.040) 
Lambda 0.005 0.008 0.015 -0.328** -0.122* 0.101 0.013 
 (0.005) (0.024) (0.060) (0.141) (0.071) (0.136) (0.093) 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
R2 0.272 0.211 0.173 0.422 0.365 0.719 0.841 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Equity CAR Estimated cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the bank’s equity. 
Debt CAR Estimated CAR for the bank’s debt.  
Total CAR Weighted average of the CARs for equity and debt.  
∆Distance-to-Default Average daily distance-to-default (DD) value of acquirer over 11 to 180 trading days after completion is announced, less the 
average over 180 to 11 days before the deal is announced, after subtracting the value-weighted average DD score over the same 
windows across non-acquiring banks on CRSP.  
∆Equity risk  Standard deviation of excess equity returns over 11 to 180 trading days after completion is announced, less the standard deviation 
over 180 to 11 days before the deal is announced, after subtracting the standard deviation of value-weighted bank index returns 
over the same windows across non-acquiring banks on CRSP 
∆Debt risk Standard deviation of excess debt returns over 11 to 180 trading days after completion is announced, less the standard deviation 
over 180 to 11 days before the deal is announced, after subtracting the standard deviation of value-weighted bank index returns 
over the same windows across non-acquiring banks on CRSP 
∆IPP 
Average industry-adjusted insurance price premium (IPP) during days 180 to 11 before the announcement, and days 11 to 180 
after completion, less the changes in value-weighted IPP over the same window across non-acquiring banks on CRSP. 
CEO relative inside debt ratio Ratio of CEO’s inside debt to equity holdings, scaled by the bank’s debt-to-equity ratio. 
CEO vega Vega is the rate of change of the value of the CEO’s portfolio of inside equity and options with respect to the volatility of the 
shares, scaled by total cash compensation  
CEO delta Delta is the rate of change of the value of the portfolio with respect to the price of the shares, scaled by total cash compensation 
Ln(Assets) Natural log of the book value of bank assets. 
Net income/Assets Net income scaled by book value of bank assets. 
Charter value Market value of assets scaled by book value of assets. 
Equity/Assets Tier-1 equity scaled by book value of assets. 
CEO is chair Equal to one if the CEO also serves as Chairman, and zero otherwise. 
%boardindep Percentage of independent directors on the bank board. 
Board size Number of directors on the bank board. 
Ln(CEO age) Natural logarithm of CEO age. 
Relative size Dollar amount paid for the target bank divided by the acquirer’s market capitalization at the time of the acquisition announcement. 
Diversifying takeover Equal to one if the target and acquirer have different SIC sub-industry classifications and zero otherwise. 
Private target Equal to one if the acquisition involved a private target and zero otherwise. 
Method of financing % of stock financing to fund the acquisition 
Macro conditions State-coincident index provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s which captures macroeconomic conditions in the 
state where the acquirer is headquartered. 
Appendix B: Explaining banks’ propensity to acquire. The table shows the first stage probit estimation results 
from a Heckman estimation framework. The first step estimates the likelihood that a bank becomes an acquirer. The 
dependent variable is equal to one if a bank makes an acquisition in the relevant financial year, and zero otherwise. 
Historical Asset Growth is a new variable intended to proxy for a bank’s propensity to acquire, but not its risk after 
acquisition. It is computed as the three-year growth in bank assets relative to the industry prior to the year in which 
the acquisition was announced. The coefficient of Net income/Assets is expressed in percentage points for ease of 
interpretation. All variable definitions are given in Appendix A. Robust standard errors clustered by bank are in 
parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. * (**) (***) = significant at 10% (5%) (1%) level. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Historical Asset Growth -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.033*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
CEO relative inside debt ratio  0.943 0.960 
  (0.801) (0.816) 
CEO vega  0.393 0.439 
  (0.671) (0.684) 
CEO delta  -0.137 -0.141 
  (0.120) (0.125) 
Ln(Assets)  0.233*** 0.239*** 
  (0.041) (0.046) 
Net income/Assets  1.623*** 1.627*** 
  (0.414) (0.416) 
Charter value  -0.242*** -0.241*** 
  (0.067) (0.066) 
Leverage  -0.057 -0.058 
  (0.040) (0.041) 
CEO is chair   -0.093 
   (0.171) 
%boardindep   -0.263 
   (1.013) 
Board size   0.001 
   (0.027) 
Ln(CEO age)  -1.116* -1.039 
  (0.576) (0.643) 
Macro  0.583 0.569 
  (0.461) (0.467) 
Observations 1,772 1,772 1,772 
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.399 0.400 
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Appendix C: Calculation of variables required for market value of debt, Default Risk and IPP 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Hillegeist et al. (2004) show that, under the assumption that market value of assets 
follows a geometric Brownian motion, the market value of equity can be derived from the Black and Scholes (1973) 
option pricing formula for call options as: 
VE,t  =  VA,tN(d1,t) – Be–rTN(d2,t) (C.1) 
where 
 d1,t  =  (ln(VA,t/B) + (r + (σ2A,t/2))T )/σA,tT (C.2) 
 d2,t  =  d1,t – σAT0.5 (C.3) 
where VE,t  is the market value of equity, VA,t is the market value of assets, B is the book value of liabilities updated 
quarter by quarter, r is the risk-free rate on one-year T-bills as at the bank’s financial year-end, T is the horizon over 
which we predict distance-to-default of the bank and is set to one year, σA,t is the standard deviation of the market 
value of assets, and N(.) represents the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. We solve for 
two unknowns, VA,t and σA,t, by using an iterative procedure as outlined in Hilleigeist et al. (2004). This involves 
simultaneously solving equation C.1 and the following optimal hedge equation: 
 σE,t  = VA,tN(d1)σA,t/VE,t (C.4) 
where σE,t is the standard deviation of the daily stock return measured over the rolling period t-90 to day t. The 
above estimates of VA,t and σA,t are used in the calculation of market value of debt and distance-to-default DD. 
For the market value of debt, we follow Eisdorfer et al. (2013) and calculate it as the difference between market 
value of assets (VA,t) and market value of equity (VE,t ).  
For the insurance price premium IPP, the procedure for calculating VA,t and σA,t is similar to the above. The only 
difference is that the book value of liabilities B is now multiplied by an additional parameter, ρ, which takes into 
account regulatory forbearance wherein the regulator (FDIC) might not liquidate the bank immediately. ρ is set at 
0.97, which means that the regulator is assumed to proceed with liquidation if the market value of assets falls below 
97% of the bank’s liabilities. The regression estimates are not sensitive to the chosen value for ρ. 
